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In this paper, we study the structural change occurring in Japan’s post-World War II era
of rapid economic growth. We use a two-sector neoclassical growth model with government
policies to analyze the evolution of the Japanese economy in this period and to assess the
role of such policies. Our model is able to replicate the empirical behavior of the main
macroeconomic variables. Three ﬁndings emerge from our policy analysis. First, neither
price and investment subsidies to the agricultural sector, nor industrial policy play a crucial
role in the rapid postwar growth. Second, while a government subsidy for families in urban
areas could have facilitated migration from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector,
such a policy would not have improved the overall performance of the Japanese economy.
Finally, had there existed a labor migration barrier, the negative long-run level e ect on
output would have been substantial.
Keywords: Two-sector growth model; Structural change; Government policies
JEL Classiﬁcation: E1, O1, O41
 This project has been supported by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI). We
would like to thank Fumio Hayashi and Edward Prescott for useful comments and discussions. We also acknowl-
edge the signiﬁcant contribution of Shuhei Aoki through his superb research assistance. We also beneﬁted from
the useful comments of Koichi Hamada, Hiro Kasahara, Keisuke Otsu, Tetsushi Sonobe and other seminar par-
ticipants at FASID, GRIPS, RIETI, University of Tokyo, Yale University, and 10th Macroconference in Tokyo.
Usual disclaimars apply.
†Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033,
Japan. E-mail: julen@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp; Tel: +81-3-5841-5526; Fax: +81-3-5841-8294.
‡Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. Email: sawada@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-E -001
 1 Introduction
Japan’s successful postwar development has been a popular topic of investigation in a wide
range of economic literature. On the empirical side, economic historians such as Ohkawa and
Rosovsky (1973) have made a signiﬁcant contribution in constructing and analyzing long-term
macroeconomic data from Japan following Simon Kuzunets’ quantitative approach to the modern
economic growth. In the tradition of development economics, researchers such as Minami (1968)
and Yasuba (1975) employed the dualistic development models of Lewis (1954), Jorgenson (1961),
and Ranis and Fei (1961), to identify the timing of Japan’s turning point from a labor-abundant
economy to the labor-shortage phase. More policy-oriented studies, such as James, Naya, and
Meier (1989) and World Bank (1993) can be found in the context of Japan and other high-
performing East Asian economies including South Korea and Taiwan.
Many theoretical studies from the 1960s and 1970s formulated multi-sector economic growth
models, beginning with Shinkai (1960), Uzawa (1961, 1963), and Inada (1963). Indeed, Inada
and Uzawa (1972) and Inada, Sekiguchi, and Shoda (1993) present a formal theory of economic
development to explain the mechanism of an aggregate industrial development pattern in Japan,
which takes into account the important role of food and labor supply as well as the performance
of the subsistence sector.
While such theoretical works generate important ﬁndings, there is a lack of studies trying to
reproduce the Japanese structural change and development experience in the post-World War II
period using modern modeling techniques and carefully choosing the basic structural parameters
of the model to match actual data. Moreover, there is almost no formal quantitative study which
can be used to rigorously evaluate the e ectiveness of actual policy interventions on the structural
change in Japan. This is a serious omission in the literature because, for example, the importance
of targeted industrial policies has been debated repeatedly in the context of Japanese economic
development (Johnson, 1982; Krugman, 1987; Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura, eds., 1988; Lee,
1993; Beason and Weinstein, 1996; Miwa and Ramsayer, 2004). However, without counterfactual
information, it is di cult to evaluate such policies properly. An exception is Hayashi and Prescott
(2008), who employ a two-sector neoclassical growth model to investigate the reasons why the
Japanese miracle did not take place until after World War II.
Following the model developed by Hayashi and Prescott (2008) and extending their analysis
using postwar Japanese data, the objective of this study is to further ﬁll the gap in the existing
literature by building a two-sector general equilibrium growth model forJapan’s postwar era. By
doing so, we seek to understand the forces underlying the rapid economic growth and structural
change in employment from agricultural to non-agricultural activities. We further use the model
to formally evaluate the e ectiveness of postwar Japan’s unique policy interventions.
The model is a two-sector neoclassical growth model, where the driving forces of the economy
are innovations in technology, in the form of increases in total factor productivity (TFP), in both
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. We assume Engel’s law, which implies a lower need for
1workers in the agricultural sector as productivity grows and a shift towards manufacturing and
other non-agricultural industries. We incorporate several government policies aimed at protecting
agriculture while helping the development of both sectors. Such policies include price subsidies
for agricultural goods and subsidies for the rental cost of capital for farmers and ﬁrms. The
model is carefully calibrated to match the Japanese empirical evidence in the postwar period,
and then solved using a perfect foresight shooting algorithm as in Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Since the relative price of agricultural goods is determined endogenously in the model and
there are a variety of government policies in place, pure agricultural productivity growth may
not be su cient to explain the rapid structural transformation in Japan, as indicated by Hayami
Akino, Shintani and Yamada (1975) and Minami (1994).1 Our results show, however, that it is
the combination of TFP growth in the agricultural sector together with very high TFP growth
in the non-agricultural industries that is responsible for the structural transformation and the
Japanese economic miracle. We also show that the government policies studied in this paper
do not play a crucial role, and that other than changing the relative prices, they do not a ect
the overall behavior of aggregate macroeconomic variables such as output per capita or the
capital-output ratio.
Our model and solution method, while based on Hayashi and Prescott (2008), is also related to
the analytical framework of two-sector growth models such as Matsuyama (1992, 2007), Banerjee
and Newman (1998) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1993); it is also related to the numerical techniques
of two-sector growth models of Casselli and Coleman (2001), Laitner (2000), Hansen and Prescott
(2002), and Lucas (2004); it likewise relates to the recent development accounting literature, such
as Vollrath (2008), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2004, 2007), Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008),
and Temple (2005).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy describe
the postwar Japanese economy by looking at several time series macroeconomic variables. Section
3 explains the two-sector growth model and its equilibrium conditions which will be matched
with data. In Section 4, we brieﬂy present the data and calibration procedure. Section 5 shows
the simulation results and a set of counterfactual policy experiments. In the ﬁnal section, we
conclude and discuss the direction of future research.
2 Postwar Japanese Economy
In order to understand the Japanese experience in the postwar era and be able to build a model
that can study the policies used by government, we now summarize the main stylized facts of
the Japanese economy in the period between the end of World War II and the start of the
1Solow (2005) criticized the two-sector growth models, which are constructed for a consumer-good-producing
sector and an investment-good-sector for farm and non-farm sectors in the development context, stating that too
much in those models turned out to depend on di erences in factor intensity between the sectors, and that we
have very little in the way of facts or intuition about that issue. We overcome this criticism by carefully matching
the postwar Japanese data with the model .
2Lost Decade, i.e., 1990. We also summarize some of the most important and discussed policies
implemented by the government during this time. These policies are later included in the model
to understand their impact on the structural change and overall evolution of the economy.
2.1 Stylized Facts
With the aid of Figures 1 and 2, we ﬁrst show the main stylized facts of the postwar Japanese
economy, which the model presented below tries to reproduce. The description of the data and
its sources can be found in the Data Appendix.
1. Rapid Output Growth
Figure 1 (a) shows the well-known fact that Japan’s economic recovery after the war was
followed by a rapid output increase in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This rapid growth process
of the Japanese economy, which has been studied widely in the existing literature such as
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Minami (1994), Nakamura (1995), and Kosai and Kaminski
(1986), continued until 1973, the year of global inﬂation and the ﬁrst oil crisis. The average
growth rate of GNP between 1956 to 1973 was a remarkable 7.4%. The oil crisis terminated
Japan’s rapid growth era, which was followed by a period of slower but stable growth, with
an average per capita output growth of 2.8% between 1973 and 1990.
2. Decrease in Agricultural Employment Share
Figure 1 (b) presents the share of employment in agriculture. As we can see, as Japan’s
rapid growth progressed, labor ﬂowed from the agricultural sector into non-agricultural
industries. Such a trend clearly started in the 1950s, when the share of employment in
agriculture was close to 34%, and continued until the ﬁrst oil crisis, when it was 12%.
After the ﬁrst oil shock, labor continueed to shift towards the non-agricultural industries,
but at a lower rate, stabilizing at around 6% in 1990.
3. Increase in the Capital-Labor Ratio in Agriculture Relative to Non-Agriculture
The massive labor migration prior to the ﬁrst oil crisis coincided with an increase in the
capital-labor ratio of agriculture relative to non-agriculture, as can be seen in Figure 1
(c). This pattern seems to arise from a sharp increase in capital inputs in agriculture after
the war. In fact, a distinct feature of the postwar agricultural development of Japan was
the spurt of farm mechanization through "mini-tractorization," i.e., a rapid introduction
of small-scale tractors with less than 10 horsepower (Hayami, et al., 1975). This mech-
anization was paralleled by the period of industrial and economic development since the
mid-1950s.
4. Low Agricultural Wages
Figure 1 (d) shows the existence of a persistent di erential between wages in the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors. In spite of this large wage gap, the adjustment of the economy
3through migration out of agriculture did not occur rapidly, but continued for more than
15 years. At ﬁrst sight, it seems puzzling why labor market adjustment did not take place
in a shorter period of time. Indeed, this slow adjustment may be a reﬂection of a unique
feature of Japanese farm households. After the war, farmers found it increasingly di cult to
ﬁnance household expenses by farming alone, and were forced to supplement their income
with earnings outside of agriculture. As industrialization gradually spread throughout
the country, farmers’ sons and daughters started working in the industrial sector. In this
way, it became common for agricultural households to combine farm earnings and non-
farm income. Accordingly, Japan experienced a growing shift from full-time to part-time
farming households since the 1950’s. In fact, in Japan a signiﬁcant portion of farmers are
o cially classiﬁed as part-time farm households of the second type, i.e., farm households
with more than half of their total income coming from non-farm sources.2 In particular,
Hayami and Godo (2002, 2005) report that in the postwar period, for households with some
agricultural income, on average only one quarter of their income came from agricultural
activities. As a result, the gap between agriculture and non-agriculture, in terms of income
per household, was reduced substantially, and even disappeared after the 1970s, as shown
in Table 8-7 of Hayami and Godo (2002) and Table 7-10 of Hayami (1986).
5. TFP Increase in Agriculture and Non-Agriculture
Figures 2 (a) and (b) show the evolution of TFP in the agriculture and non-agriculture
sectors, respectively. Both TFP series increased signiﬁcantly until the ﬁrst oil crisis, al-
though the growth rate of non-agricultural TFP was higher than that of agriculture. It
has been argued that TFP growth in agriculture resulted as a consequence of the accumu-
lation and di usion of the potential in agricultural technology. In other words, this TFP
improvement was the consequence of the implementation of many of the technological ad-
vancements that had been accumulated during the prewar period (Hayami and Ruttan,
1985). In non-agricultural industries, TFP augmentation became possible through the
adoption, imitation, and assimilation of the ﬂows of technical know-how from advanced
nations. Some theories state that the absorptive capacity with which the gap between
the technology frontier and the current level of productivity is ﬁlled should closely de-
pend on the level of human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). Ohkawa and Kohama
(1989) discuss how Japan is a typical example of borrowed technology-driven industrial-
ization, whose success is attributable to its rapid human capital accumulation through
which the absorptive capacity of foreign technology has been enabled. Improvements in
non-agricultural TFP in Figure 2 (b) can be understood as a realization process of the
potential of imported technologies.
2While the proportion of farm households of total households in Japan declined by 40 % between 1960 and
1995, part-time households of the second type increased by more than 20 % (Hayami and Godo, 2002).
42.2 Policy Interventions
It has been argued in the literature that the Japanese government implemented a variety of
policies, both in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, to try to stimulate the growth
and development of the economy (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1973; Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura,
1988; Kosai and Kaminski, 1986; Minami, 1994; Nakamura, 1995; and Hayami and Godo, 2002).
We describe here some of the most important policies.3
In the agricultural sector, there were two major policy instruments. The ﬁrst was price sub-
sidies for agricultural goods producers. The second, investment subsidies for the mechanization
of the agricultural sector. The main policies for non-agricultural industries related to promoting
industrial development through investment and loan subsidies. Let us explain these policies in
more detail.
The agriculture pricing policy applied mostly to rice and other major crops. The price of
rice was under the direct control of the Food Agency (Shokuryo Cho). Under this policy, the
government purchased rice from rice producers at a predetermined procurement price and later
sold it to consumers at a lower price. Since the rice price was remarkably stable, and the gap
between rice procurement and sales prices was about ﬁve percent between 1957 and 1960, the
deﬁcit of the Food Control Special Account (Shokkan Kaikei) did not rise prior to that year.
Yet, in 1960, due to strong political pressure from farmers’ organizations, the procurement rice
price formula was modiﬁed to reﬂect and cover the cost of production at the paddy ﬁeld. With
this new formula, the price paid to producers rose rapidly and the government rice purchase
price became signiﬁcantly higher than the government sales price. The price gap rose to 25.55%
on average between 1962-1980. Due to this price gap, the deﬁcit of the Food Control Special
Account became one of the most serious sources of overall government budget deﬁcits.
The second agriculture policy was the provision of production investment subsidies. There
were two major forms of such subsidies, one by supplying direct investment transfers and the
other by providing production loans at subsidized interest rates. Hayami and Godo (2002)
estimated that about half of total farm investments were ﬁnanced by government subsidies after
1970. The ratio of the amount of the investment subsidies to total agricultural investment was
26% in 1960, 45% in 1970, 58% in 1980 and 1990 (Hayami and Godo, 2002).
In the non-agricultural sector, during the period of rapid economic growth, the government
promoted industrial development with various instruments within the framework of overall in-
dustrial policy. Particularly, it has been often argued that provisions of subsidized interest rate
for targeted industries through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP or Zaisei Tou Yu-
ushi in Japanese) facilitated investments (Ogura and Yoshino, 1988; Cargill and Yoshino, 2003).
FILP is organized and managed by the government using the surplus funds of the postal savings
3While we believe that we cover major policy interventions in our study, there were other policies employed
by the government during this period. In this study, we focus on those incorporated in the model whose e ect we
can quantify and study. Hence, e ects generated by other policies should be captured by productivity changes in
our model.
5and social security funds. Through FILP, these surplus funds were employed to ﬁnance invest-
ments in infrastructure-related public enterprises such as the National Railways and the Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and private-sector investments through public ﬁnancial
institutions, such as the Housing Loan Corporation, Japan Development Bank, Export-Import
Bank, and the Small Business Finance Corporation (Ogura and Yoshino, 1988). The targeted
industries through this low interest rate policy included a wide variety of industries such as sea
transport, electric power, shipbuilding, automobiles, machinery, iron and steel, coal mining, and
petroleum reﬁning (Ogura and Yoshino, 1988).
During the period studied and up to the present, the government also implemented various
taxation policies such as taxing labor income and the corporate sector. While distortionary
taxation is one of the determinants of economic decision-making, we do not dwell on the details
because they are fairly standard and were not identiﬁed as major development-related policies
during the era of rapid growth in Japan.
3 The Two-Sector Growth Model
The model we employ to account for the facts presented above is a neoclassical growth model, in
the style of Cass-Koopmans, with two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture. Time is discrete
and there are three types of inﬁnitely lived agents in the economy: Households, ﬁrms, and the
government. Let us study them in turn.
3.1 Household
There is a representative household in the economy, and in every period the household decides
how much to consume and how much to save. It also decides how much labor and capital to
supply to each sector. The supply of labor is in terms of persons and not hours, since hours,
while entering the production function, are assumed to be exogenous to the household and ﬁrms
in the model.
We make the assumption that the household is composed of smaller groups, which we call
families, although these families have no decision power since all decisions are made at the
household level. There are two locations in the model, the rural area, where the agricultural and
some of the non-agricultural sector’s ﬁrms are located, and the urban area, where most of the
non-agricultural ﬁrms operate. Following the evidence presented in Hayami and Godo (2002,
2005), we assume that each rural family is composed of ﬁve members, and each urban family of
4 members. Furthermore, in order to be consistent with their evidence concerning the earnings
of families in Japan, we assume that when a family lives in the rural area, two members work in
the agricultural sector and the other three work for non-agricultural ﬁrms. All members in the
urban area work in the non-agricultural sector.
We further assume that in order to work in the urban area, workers must incur a cost,  t. This
6cost proxies for expenditures such as housing rent, commuting, and outside food consumption.
In Japan, most farmers own their own land and house and self-produce an important fraction
of their food consumption, which is why we assume that this cost is zero for families members
living in the rural area.4
The household earns income from labor by its members and from renting capital to ﬁrms.
The government taxes part of that income in two ways. It taxes the labor income of the non-
agricultural workers5 at rate  lt, and the return on non-agricultural capital at rate  kt.
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where     (0,1) is the discount factor; Nt is the working-age population in the economy; cat =
Cat/Nt and cnt = Cnt/Nt are the consumption per capita of the agricultural and non-agricultural
goods; qt is the relative price of the agricultural good;  t is the return on land, which is one of
the factors of production in the agricultural sector; Kt is the aggregate stock of capital, which
depreciates at a rate  t, and is supplied to agricultural and non-agricultural ﬁrms, with shares
skt and (1   skt) respectively; set is the share of employment supplied to the agricultural sector,
where Et is total employment, which is taken as given by the household; hours of work in each
sector are respectively, hat and hnt; wat, wnt, rat and rnt are the pre-tax wages per hour, and the
return on capital for each sector; the term  t
 




associated with the non-agricultural workers who live in an urban area6; Tt is the total amount
of lump-sum taxes levied by the government; we assume Engel’s Law and impose the Stone-
Geary utility function u(ca,c n)   µa log(ca ¯ a)+µn logcn, where µa, µn and ¯ a are non-negative
parameters.
There should be no arbitrage possibilities in the labor and capital markets, which means that
the household chooses the fraction of employment and capital for each sector so that the after-tax
4According to the Housing and Land Survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal
A airs and Communications, house and land ownership rates of households engaged in agriculture, forestry, and
ﬁshery were 96.3% and 96.7%, respectively, in 2003 <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jyutaku/2003/pdf/15-7.pdf>.
The corresponding rates for employees in the private sector were 57.8% and 54.7%, respectively.
5It has been argued that in Japan a very high fraction of farmers evade taxes.
6Each rural family is composed of 5 members, and 3 of those members work in the non-agricultural sector.
Hence, since setEt individuals work in the agricultural sector, and for every 2 members of a rural family who
work in the agricultural sector, there are 3 who work in the other sector, then
3
2setEt persons work in the
non-agricultural sector and do no pay the cost.
7return is equated. In the case of employment, what needs to be equalized is the income of the
family in a rural area and in an urban area. The equalization of income between the two types
of families is consistent with the evidence presented by Hayami and Godo (2005), and which is
explained in the previous section. In terms of the model, when the household decides to assign
a worker to the agricultural sector, it also assigns three workers to non-agricultural sector in the
rural area, where they do not pay the cost  t. However, every member of the urban area pays the
cost  t. Hence, the appropriate comparison is not between wages in the two sectors, but between
the income of a whole family in the rural area and a whole family in the urban area. Assuming
that the cost per worker of living in an urban area is proportional to the non-agricultural wage,
 t =  twnthnt, set is chosen so that the following condition holds
2wathat + 3(1    lt)wnthnt = 4(1    lt    t)wnthnt. (3)
For capital, skt is chosen so that in equilibrium the following condition is satisﬁed
rat = (1    kt)rnt +  kt t, (4)
and we deﬁne rt as this after-tax rate, i.e., rt = rat = (1    kt)rnt +  kt t.
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where 1/ t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s budget constraint. Given
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3.2 Firms
Firms rent capital and labor from the household and produce output which is sold back to
the consumers. In order to stimulate the use of capital, the government provides a subsidy for
the rental cost of capital, where the subsidy rates are  kat and  knt for agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors respectively. The government further protects the interests of the agricultural
sector by providing a subsidy on the price of their goods. The consumer pays a price qt for the
8agricultural good, but the price received by the producer is (1 +  qt)qt.
3.2.1 Firm in the Agricultural Sector
A ﬁrm in the agricultural sector rents capital and hires labor to maximize its proﬁts.7 Therefore,
every period the ﬁrm chooses {Kat,L at} to maximize
(1 +  qt)qtYat   (1    kat)ratKat   watLat, (10)




where Yat is agricultural output; Aat is total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector; Lat is
labor input of the ﬁrm, which is a combination of hours and employees; and  a,    (0,1), with
 a +   < 1.
The optimal conditions for this problem deliver the equilibrium factor prices
rat =
(1 +  qt)










3.2.2 Firm in the Non-Agricultural Sector
Similarly, a ﬁrm in the non-agricultural sector chooses {Knt,L nt} to maximize
Ynt   (1    knt)rntKnt   wntLnt (14)
s.t. Ynt = AntK n
nt L1  n
nt , (15)
where Ynt, Ant, and Lnt are respectively, output, TFP, and labor input in the non-agricultural
sector;  n   (0,1).
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nt , (16)
wnt = (1    n)AntK n
nt L  n
nt . (17)
3.3 Government
The government collects lump-sum labor and capital income taxes from the household, subsidizes
the price of agricultural goods and the rental cost of capital for ﬁrms, and spends Gt units of
non-agricultural output as government expenditures. The government budget constraint, which
7The production function of the agricultural ﬁrms also includes land as a factor, but since it is assumed to be
ﬁxed, it is not explicitly shown in the problem.
9is assumed to be balanced every period, is as follows
Tt +  ltwnthnt (1   set)Et +  kt(rnt    t)(1   skt)Kt
=  qtqtYat +  katratKat +  kntrntKnt + Gt. (18)
3.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium, given K0, and a government policy {Gt,T t, lt, kt, qt, kat, knt}
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is a set of allocations for the household {cat,c nt,K t+1,s et,s kt}
 
t=0 and for the ﬁrms
{Yat,Y nt,K at,K nt,L at,L nt}
 
t=0, and a price system {qt,w at,w nt,r at,r nt}
 
t=0, such that agents
optimize, markets clear, and government has a balanced budget. Agents optimize on two sides:
ﬁrst, given government policy and prices, the allocations solve the household’s maximization
problem, whose solution is characterized by equations (3) to (7). Second, given government
policy and prices, the allocations solve the proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms in each sector, whose
solution is characterized by equations (12), (13), (16) and (17). Markets clear in four markets:
agricultural good, non-agricultural good, capital, and two labor markets, respectively,
Yat = Ntcat, (19)
Ynt   Gt = Ntcnt +
 





 twnthnt + Kt+1   (1    )Kt, (20)
Kt = Kat + Knt, (21)
Lat = hatsetEt, (22)
Lnt = hnt (1   set)Et. (23)
Finally, government has a balanced budget, as in equation (18).
3.5 Reduced Detrended Equilibrium
The equilibrium stated above is non-stationary since TFP in both sectors and population grow
over time. We now deﬁne two trends, detrend the model, and reduce it to a dynamic system of
two equations.
Following Hayashi and Prescott (2008), we deﬁne XQt   A 1
at (hatEt)










Nt . XQt is the trend of the relative price of agricultural goods, qt; XYt
is the trend of the non-agricultural sector per-capita variables, and that of  t; and XYt
XQt is the
trend of the agricultural sector per-capita variables. Hence we can deﬁne the following detrended
variables
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XYtNt
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Similarly we can deﬁne















Using these deﬁnitions in the equilibrium conditions and plugging the factor prices into the
Euler equation (7) and into the non-agricultural market clearing condition (20), we can reduce
the equilibrium into a system of two equations in ˜ kt and ˜  t:
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, (25)
where  t   Gt
Ynt.
The other variables of the model can be found using the equilibrium conditions once we have
solved for ˜ kt and ˜  t. In particular, we solve for (skt,s et, ˜ qt) given
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4 Calibration and Simulation Procedure
To simulate the model, we need to provide values for the parameters of the model and for the
exogenous variables. The complete description of the data can be found in the Data Appendix.
The next subsections explain the calibration and describe the exogenous variables used in the
simulations.
114.1 Calibration
We use Japanese data for the period between 1956 to 1990 to calibrate the model parameters.
The period in the model is one year.
The discount factor,  , is chosen to match the following aggregate values: the capital-output
ratio of the economy in the ﬁnal period of the simulation, 1990, is set at 1.87; steady state growth
rate is assumed to be 2%; non-agricultural capital tax rate  kt is set at 0.35 based on Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994); and non-agricultural capital-output ratio is 1.87 from Hayashi and
Prescott (2003). The resultant discount factor is that   =0 .963.
The per period utility function is of the Stone-Geary type and has the form u(ca,c n)  
µa log(ca   ¯ a)+µn logcn, where ¯ a is the agricultural good subsistence level. We follow Gollin,
Parente and Rogerson (2004) and calibrate the value of ¯ a to match the share of agricultural
output in 1956, 12%, and set it to ¯ a = 63.2. Combining the two Frisch demand equations (8)




(cat   ¯ a)qt
cnt
. (29)
We normalize µa +µn =1and given ¯ a we choose µa to satisfy (29) for the average between 1956
and 1990, and set it to µa =0 .0012 .
The parameters in the technology function of the two sectors are chosen as follows. First we
set  n =0 .33, as in Hayashi and Prescott (2008). Then we calibrate  a so that the no-arbitrage
condition on capital (4) is satisﬁed over the sample period, and set it to  a =0 .36. Finally, with
data from Hayami et al. (1975), we calibrate and set   to   =0 .45 using the following condition
from Hayashi and Prescott (2008):
  = (1    a)  
labor share
labor share + land share
.
Table 1 summarizes the choice of parameter values.
Table 1: Model Parameters
  =0 .963 µa =0 .0025 ¯ a = 63.2
 n =0 .33  a =0 .36   =0 .45
4.2 Exogenous Variables
The variables that are exogenous in the model, whose paths we feed in order to solve the model,
are: TFP in both sectors, Aat and Ant; Population, Nt; aggregate employment, Et; hours in each
sector, hat,h nt; capital depreciation rate,  t; government expenditure share of output,  t; labor
and capital income tax rate,  lt,  kt; agricultural price subsidy rate,  qt; ﬁrm’s capital rental cost
in both sectors,  kat and  knt; and the fraction of wages devoted to pay cost of living in urban
area,  t.
12The sources and construction of these variables for the sample from 1956 to 1990 can be
found in the Data Appendix. After the ﬁnal year of the simulation, 1990, we assume that these
variables remain constant at the 1990 level,8 as is done in other studies that use the perfect
foresight shooting algorithm solution technique (i.e. Hayashi and Prescott, 2002 and 2008, Chen
Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu, 2007).
4.3 Simulation Procedure
In order to numerically solve the model, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002, 2008) and impose
that the economy reaches a steady state far enough in the future. Then, starting from the
conditions of the Japanese economy in 1956, we use a perfect foresight shooting algorithm to
ﬁnd the path of the variables in the model from this initial condition to the ﬁnal steady state.
This path is conditional on the evolution of the exogenous variables which are fed to the model
and which were stated above.9
5 Results
As explained in Section (2) the Japanese postwar structural change experience was characterized
by a high output growth period, accompanied by a decrease in the share of employment in
agriculture and an increase in the capital-labor ratio of the agricultural sector relative to that of
the non-agricultural industries. Other facts about this period related to variables in the model,
and against which we test our theory, are the decline in the share of capital in agriculture, the
increase in the overall capital-output ratio, and the relatively slow movement of the relative price
of agricultural goods, with a fairly constant mean, over the whole sample period.
We now proceed to explain the performance of the model in terms of the previous facts. Later
we present the e ects of the counterfactual experiments performed to understand the role of the
di erent government policies in the postwar structural change.
5.1 Simulation Results
As we can see from Figures 3 (a)-(f), our model can predict the actual time series data of the
postwar Japanese economy reasonably well. In particular, the model is able to reproduce the
evolution of the main macroeconomic variables as well as the variables of our focus, such as
per capita GNP, capital output ratio, and employment share. Speciﬁcally, as can be seen in
Figure 3 (a), the model captures well the rapid decline in the share of agricultural employment
8This assumption may seem extreme, since Japan entered a long recession in 1991 and it has been argued
that at least TFP declined sharply for almost a decade (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). However, the focus of the
paper is on the long-run structural change and development of the Japanese economy, which by the year 1990 was
clearly ﬁnalized. Moreover, recent data suggests that the Japanese economy and in particular TFP are growing
again at a healthy rate. Hence since we do not aim to explain the Japanese Lost Decade, we abstract from this
period and stop our simulation in 1990, assuming constant values for the exogenous variables after that year.
9For more details on the simulation procedure, see Appendix A of Hayashi and Prescott (2008).
13in the period prior to the ﬁrst oil shock, followed by a slower decline after this event. As shown
in Figure 3 (e), the model also reproduces the high output growth from 1956 to 1973 and its
slowdown thereafter, although it slightly over-predicts the growth rate in the ﬁrst part of the
sample. The movements of the capital-output ratio (Figure 3 (d)), which in the data is fairly
stable until 1970, then increases over the 1970s and stabilizes again with the arrival of the 1980s,
are also captured by our model, although the level is slightly higher than in the data.
For the other model variables of interest, such as the share of capital in agriculture shown
in Figure 3 (b), the relative capital per worker across industries in Figure 3 (c) and the relative
price of the agricultural good in Figure 3 (f), the model’s prediction is less accurate. Possibly,
these discrepancies arise from short-run volatilities of the agricultural TFP as shown in Figure
2. However, the model is able to reproduce the overall downward or upward trends of these
variables, and to capture the changes in their levels from the mid-1950s to the end of the bubble
period.
5.2 E ects of the Government Policies
We now show the results of the counterfactual experiments, in which we change the values of the
government policy instruments, leaving everything else the same, in order to study how crucial
the di erent policies are in accounting for the evolution of the Japanese economy in this period.
The ﬁrst counter-factual policy simulation involves setting all the government subsidies to
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to zero, i.e.  qt =0 , kat =0 , and  knt =0 . As we can
see in Figures 4 (a)-(f), the removal of these policies does not generate signiﬁcant changes in the
behavior of most of the variables. However, we can observe that the agricultural employment
share becomes slightly higher, both in the transition and in the long-run, than in the benchmark
simulation. We can also see that the relative price of agricultural products is substantially higher
throughout the period, which seems to be a direct consequence of the removal of price subsidies
and the cost increase in the capital utilization. These results indicate that, overall, subsidies
a ect the agricultural sector in a small measure, mostly by keeping prices low, but the aggregate
impact is not necessarily large. We also perform policy simulations by sequentially setting each
one of these subsidies to zero. However, we ﬁnd that the overall impact of such policy changes
is not signiﬁcantly di erent from the results shown in Figure 4 (a)-(f).10 The results of this
counterfactual policy experiment may be seen as surprising, since they seem to contradict many
existing studies which point to the existence of serious ine ciencies in the Japanese economy
generated by agricultural protection policies (Hayami and Godo, 2002) and the signiﬁcance of
industrial policies during the rapid growth era (Johnson, 1982; Kosai and Kaminski, 1986). As
for the industrial policy, some researchers have argued that the mode in which the government
intervened in Japan was through dialogue, persuasion, and signaling, since government-directed
credits through FILP were less than ten percent of total loans made to the industrial sector
10These results are available from the authors upon request.
14(Hayami and Godo, 2005). Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, eds., (1988) also conclude that the
contributions of industrial policies in Japan came from the sharing of information between the
government and the private sector through dialogues in various committees and councils. In fact,
a more accurate interpretation of our results is that if policies a ected postwar rapid growth,
they should have operated through TFP. The results of our paper are consistent with these views
on Japan’s industrial policy.
The second policy change we study is the inclusion of a government subsidy to help families
in the urban areas with the cost associated with living there,11  t in the model. In particular
we perform a counterfactual experiment where the government covers a fraction of this cost, and
set this fraction to be 30%. The results show an important decline in the share of agricultural
employment, especially in the transition, although not in the long-run; there is no signiﬁcant
change in the behavior of output or the capital-output ratio. In other words, while these costs
are an important part of keeping workers in the agricultural sector, they do not improve the
overall impressive performance of Japan in terms of output. The irrelevance of this subsidy in
terms of changing the evolution of output can be understood by looking at the behavior of the
share of capital in agriculture. Parallel to the lower employment share relative to the benchmark
model, this subsidy produces an increase in the share of capital. This result hinges on two
assumptions of the model. The ﬁrst is Engel’s law, which implies that there a certain amount of
agricultural goods which need to be produced. The second is the free mobility of capital across
sectors. With the inclusion of this subsidy, the household ﬁnds it optimal to assign less workers
to the agricultural sector and produces the necessary food with more capital. Hence, for the
non-agricultural output, which dominates GNP both in the data and in our model, there is an
increase in labor input, but a decrease in capital, which leaves output and the capital-output
ratio mostly una ected.
Finally, we incorporate the key assumption that Hayashi and Prescott (2008) use to explain
the delay in the Japanese miracle, namely the existence of a labor barrier that prevented workers
from migrating out of agriculture. This barrier imposes a minimum number of workers in this
sector of 14 million. Introducing this mobility friction in our model results in a dramatic change
in some of the variables. In particular, as would be expected, the share of labor in agriculture
is much higher and decreases very slowly. However, as in the case of the subsidy to the cost of
living in an urban area, this di erent evolution of the employment share is mirrored by a decrease
in the share of capital in agriculture. In this case, since workers are not allowed to move out of
agriculture, but the economy only needs a certain amount of food production, capital is shifted
out of agriculture and into non-agricultural industries. In this case, however, the change in the
evolution of output is signiﬁcant. With substantially less workers in the non-agricultural sector,
output grows fast, but less than in the benchmark case because decreasing marginal productivity
of capital a ects output considerably. This growth di erence accumulates over time and becomes
11While we are not aware that the Japanese government actively pursued this policy, we perform this counter-
factual experiment to understand the e ects of a policy of this type in the evolution of the economy.
15signiﬁcant by the end of the sample. The di erence between the output from the data and in
this counterfactual experiment is nearly 18 % for 1990. Therefore, our results may be seen as
being consistent with those derived by Hayashi and Prescott (2008). With the barrier, Japan’s
postwar GNP growth would have been lower and the long-run level e ect substantial. In other
words, the elimination of this barrier can be seen as one of the important contributors to Japan’s
postwar economic miracle.
5.3 Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we perform four additional analyses.12 First,
we consider a small open economy version of our model. While existing studies such as Ohkawa
and Rosovsky (1973) and Minami (1994), as well as the canonical openness index based on the
Penn World Table data, show that modeling Japan as a closed economy is a good approximation,
assuming a closed or an open economy model is crucial to the results of papers such as Matsuyama
(1992). Hence, we relax the closed economy assumption by postulating that both agriculture and
non-agriculture goods are tradable, but capital is not13. In the small open economy speciﬁcation
of the model, where consumption goods are tradable in the international market, the relative
price of the agriculture good, qt, becomes exogenous. The simulation results for the model under
the small open economy speciﬁcation indicate that the main qualitative conclusions of the paper
still hold. That is, the Japanese growth miracle and the decline in agricultural employment share
are due to the high growth of TFP, and the e ect of government policies are not substantial.
Second, we assess the importance of TFP growth in the agricultural sector by removing it
from the simulation. That is, we assume that only non-agricultural TFP grows over the studied
period, whereas agricultural TFP remains at the 1956 level. Under this alternative path of
sectoral TFP, the model generates very similar results as the baseline model, suggesting that the
the most important factor is the high TFP growth in the non-agricultural sector.
Third, in order to assess the role of the divergence path of TFP between the two sectors in
the structural change, we perform two simulations in which we impose the same growth rate of
TFP for both sectors. When we set the growth rate to be that of non-agricultural TFP, the
qualitative results do not fundamentally change. However, in the simulation where we set TFP
in non-agriculture to grow at the same rate as the observed growth rate in agricultural TFP,
output per capita grows at a much lower rate than the baseline model. Hence, this corroborates
our prior statement that it is the high growth of non-agricultural TFP which drives the Japanese
miracle and the structural change of the economy.
Finally, we assess the performance of the model when we remove from it the assumption of
the family structure and the costs of living in the urban area. Given the large di erences in the
data in terms of wages for agricultural and non-agricultural activities, we cannot assume that
12These results are not shown in this paper, but are available from the authors upon request.
13The ﬂow of capital goods is highly restricted in Japan for our sample period, especially in the ﬁrst part.
Hence, modeling capital as a non-tradable good is a reasonable assumption.
16the household freely assigns workers to each sector, since that would imply wage equalization
in the model and contradict the data. Therefore, the simple exercise we perform is to remove
the family assumption, and consider the share of agricultural employment as exogenous. This is
still an interesting exercise, since under this speciﬁcation, the model still delivers endogenously
important macroeconomic variables, such as aggregate capital, the share of capital in agriculture,
aggregate output, and the relative price of agricultural goods. The simulation results show that
the main conclusions of the paper are still valid.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the two-sector neoclassical growth model of Hayashi and Prescott (2008)
to include policies used by the Japanese government in the post-World War II period, and study
the structural change in Japan’s rapid post-war economic growth. Our model is able to reproduce
the actual time series data for the postwar Japanese economy reasonably well. Based on our
model, three ﬁndings emerge from the policy simulations. First, price and investment subsidies
for the agricultural sector and industrial policy in the form of the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Program (FILP) have limited impact on the aggregate growth performance of Japan. Second,
while a government subsidy to help families in urban areas could have facilitated migration from
the agricultureal to the non-agricultural sector in the rapid growth era, such a policy would not
have improved Japan’s overall performance. Finally, with the counterfactual labor migration
barrier, Japan’s postwar GNP growth would have been lower and the long-run level e ect would
have been substantial. In other words, the elimination of the barrier can be seen as one of the
most important contributors to Japan’s postwar economic miracle.
There are, however, two caveats to our study. First, while we believe that our policy simula-
tions cover the major policy interventions in postwar Japan, there are other important interven-
tions, including other forms of industrial policy, i.e. special capital depreciation schemes (Ogura
and Yoshino, 1988), public investments in a variety of infrastructures, and agricultural trade
protection policies, which we do not consider explicitly in our model. A correct interpretation of
our results is that if policies a ected postwar rapid growth, they should have operated through
TFP in our model. Second, we impose the assumption of exogenous TFP. While this exogeneity
assumption delivers a close ﬁt of our model to the data, it can be relaxed by endogenizing human
capital investment in international technological transfers (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005), consid-
ering ﬁrms’ research and development decisions (Romer, 1990), or incorporating government’s
agricultural research and extension (R&E) activities (Rustichini and Schmitz, 1991). We leave
the inclusion of these dimensions for future work (Aoki, et al., 2009).
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21Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the sources and construction of the data employed in the analysis.
Basically, we employ and extend the data set of Hayashi and Prescott (2008), 14 which compiled
postwar data series for real GNP, its deﬂator, the size of the working-age population, employment
in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, hours worked per week in the two sectors, and
nominal private capital stock. The extensions we make to their data and the other variables are
explained below.
• Kat (agricultural capital stock): We extrapolate postwar agriculture capital stock data
by the following procedure. From 1956 to 1962, we extrapolate the data using agricul-
tural real net capital stock in Long Term Economic Statistics (LTES) of Hitotsubashi
University. Speciﬁcally, we use their “net capital stock in agriculture in million yen, 1934-
36 prices” in LTES, Vol.3, Table 3. From 1963 to 1970, we extrapolate the data us-
ing agricultural real gross capital stock in Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979) (“gross capital
stock in agriculture in million yen, 1934-36 prices” in Ohkawa and Shinohara, 1979, Table
A18). As for the data after 1971, we extrapolate the series using agricultural real net
capital stock in the database called JIP2008, which is extracted from RIETI’s web page
<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/JIP2008/index.html>. This real net capital stock
in JIP2008 is the sum of “rice, wheat production,” “miscellaneous crop farming,” “live-
stock and sericulture farming,” and “agricultural services” (in million yen, 2000 prices) in
JIP2008.
• Aat and Ant (agricultural and non-agricultural TFP): We use the the production functions
on both sectors (11) and (15), and data on output, capital, employment and hours in each









1  n .
•   (depreciation rate of capita): Data on the depreciation rate of capital is taken from the
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) database, which is downloadable from Fumio Hayashi’s web
page <http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Hayashi-Prescott1_data.htm>.
• Cat and Cnt (consumption of agriculture and non-agriculture goods): Nominal aggregate
consumption is also taken from the Hayashi and Prescott (2002) database. Since from the
model, patCat = patYat, where Cat   Ntcat, nominal non-agricultural consumption can be
calculated by PCt   patCat where PCt is nominal aggregate consumption.
•  t (ratio between government consumption and non-agricultural value added): Nominal
government consumption is taken from the Hayashi and Prescott (2002) database. We
14The dataset used for the 2006 working paper version of their paper can be found in Fumio Hayashi’s website
<http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Hayashi-Prescott2.htm>.
22divide this government consumption, Gt, by nominal non-agricultural value added, Ynt, to
derive the ratio,  t.
•  kt (tax rate on capital income) and  lt (tax rate on labor income): Tax rates on capital and
labor incomes are taken from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) and its further update are
extracted from Enrique Mendoza’s web page <http://www.econ.umd.edu/~mendoza/pp/newtaxdata.pdf>.
•  qt (subsidy rate on agricultural output price): The subsidy rate on output price in the
agricultural sector is based on the gap between the government’s procurement and the sales
prices of rice. This price gap is further adjusted for transaction costs that are estimated by
the absolute price gap in years 1988 to 2000. Then the adjusted price gap is multiplied by
the proportion of rice controlled by the government. The government procurement prices
are taken from Statistics on Rice Price (Beika Ni Kansuru Shiryo) of the Food Agency
(Shokuryo Cho) for the years 1951 to 1992. The sales price is from the Statistics on Rice
Price (Beika Ni Kansuru Shiryo) of the Food Agency for the years 1966 to 1992. Data on
the shares of government-controlled rice are from the statistical appendix of a White Paper
on Agriculture (Shokuryo Nogyo Nouson Hakusyo Sanko Tokei Hyo) for 1960 to 1995.
•  kat (subsidy rate on agricultural capital investments): The subsidy rate on capital invest-
ment in the agricultural sector is derived by dividing the total amount of capital subsidies
by a product of the return on capital and capital stock of the agricultural sector. For the
total amount of capital subsidies, we employ direct capital subsidy transfers in the agri-
cultural sector extracted from the Social Accounting of Agriculture and Farmers (Nougyou
Oyobi Nouka No Shakai Kanjyou), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery, for the
ﬁscal years Showa 37 (1962), Showa 50 (1975), Showa 55 (1980), Showa 60 (1985), Heisei
2 (1990), and Heisei 7 (1995).
•  knt (subsidy rate on non-agricultural capital investments): We employ the interest rate
subsidy rate through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) to proxy for the in-
terest rate subsidy rate in the non-agricultural sector. Time series data on the subsidy rate
is taken from Figure 4.10 of Cargill and Yoshino (2003). As pages 114 and 115 of Cargill
and Yoshino (2003) explain, their subsidy rate is deﬁned as the total amount of interest rate
subsidy divided by after-tax retained earnings, i.e., after-tax income less dividends. We
multiply this rate by after-tax retained earnings (Rieki Jouyo Kin) data for all ﬁrms in all
industries, which is taken from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Indus-
tries (Hojin Kigyo Toukei) of Ministry of Finance <http://www.mof.go.jp/1c002.htm>.
Since this value represents  kntrntKnt, we divide it by rntKnt, so that we obtain  knt.
We decide to employ total industry data because the after-tax retained earnings levels of
agricultural industry are negligible.
•  t (fraction of wages devoted to living cost in urban area):  t is obtained from the equal-
23ization of incomes for families in rural and urban areas, equation (3)











24Figure 1: Japan’s Postwar Experience
Figure 1:  Japan's Postwar Experience











































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Wages in panel (d) are calculated to be consistent with the deﬁnition of wages in the model. Therefore,









nt . Actual wages in the data show a similar pattern, except the
ratio of wat/wnt ﬂuctuates around 30%.
Figure 2: Evolution of Total Factor Productivity (1956=100)
















































































25Figure 3: Benchmark Model Simulation Results

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Figure 4: Policy Counter-Factual Simulation Results
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